Appendix 94. NA34/A4-3(1) 95:HTB:cha 29 March 1945 From: Commanding Officer, NASKodiak, Alaska. To: Commandant, SEVENTEENTH Naval District. Subj: PV-1, Bureau No. 8891, Ditching of on 17 March 1945. 1. PV-1, Bureau No. 8891, piloted by Lt. Moorehead, VPB-136, departed Umnak for Kodiak at 0113Z, 17 March, and was ditched at 0645Z three quarters of a mile off shore at the Karluk Cannery Station on the west side of Kodiak Island (Map Enclosure(B). 2. The route forecast between Umnak to Kodiak showed an oceluded low pressure area at 53oN - 149oW, moving northeast into the Gulf of Alaska, causing low ceilings, snow showers, and reduced visibility. In view of the weather situation, a message was originated by NAS Kodiak at 0150Z to all stations west of Kodiak as far as Cold Bay, giving the weather forecast, and advising the pilot to proceed to an alternate. During the pilots interrogation he stated he was advised of a message from Randall Airways, which was not received. 3. At 0453Z the aircraft, through Kodiak Airways, reported its position as just off the field and requested landing instructions. The Tower cleared the aircraft to runway 18. Six minutes later the aircraft requested field lights and received an affirmative. The 24" signal light was also beamed eastward at this time. Subsequent reports and radio contacts, as shown by the chronological report (Enclosure (C), proved that the pilot was unable to locate the field and that his position was doubtful. The station weather at this time was ceiling 2000', visibility 5 to 7 miles, light snow showers. (See Enclosure (D) for terminal weather entire emergency period). 4. Emergency action was taken immediately after the subject aircraft did not make its approach and landing. It was obvious from further radio contacts that the aircrafts' radio gear was not functioning properly, and that he was lost. Bearings were requested from Army and navy DF stations in the area. The bearings received were incon- clusive. Of the seven bearings received, three showed the aircrafts position north of Kodiak, three south of Kodiak, and one north-south bearing fell east of the island. All surface craft were notified of the situation and alerted. All fields in the area were requested to be lighted, and every effort was made to continue radio contacts by broadcasting blind requests for MOS on 4742.5 using the aircrafts' Gibson Girl transmitter. The Army's 60" search lights were placed in operation. A PBY stood by on the runway ready for takeoff, with its ADF tuned to 500 Kc. 5. All communication with the aircraft ceased at 0551Z at which time the pilot advised his radio gear "fouled up" and that he was "contact", course 180o, land on left. Night search was not instituted due to very low visibility and high winds for both aircraft and surface vessels: twenty-five foot waves having been reported at sea. Early morning search was set up for all aircraft and surface vessels in the vicinity, with other aircraft from Dutch Harbor and Elmendorf Field requested to aid in the search. 6. The early morning search was delayed due to weather. 7. At 1729Z a message was received from Karluk Cannery Radio that the aircraft had been ditched and all seven crew members were safe and uninjured. 8. Due to continued inclement weather no aircraft was dispatched to the ditching area. ATR 68, being in the vicinity, was dispatched to pickup the crew. 9. Subsequent reports from the pilot informed NAS Kodiak that the aircraft was ditched in approximately 45 fathoms of water and salvage operations were not considered feasible. Encls. (HW) (A) Pilots Report. (B) Map. (C) Chronological Report. (D) Terminal Weather. Appendix 95 REPORT OF CRASH OF PV-1, BUR. #48891 ____________________________________ ON 17 MARCH 1945, AT KARLUK, ALASKA ____________________________________ We passed Chirikof with about 300 ft., visibility half mile to a mile. We went between Chirikof and Nagai Rocks and headed approximately 037 on the beam. Continuing on the heading after we lost Chirikof for about 10 minutes, we then switched to the Kodiak range. It should have taken 35 minutes from Chirikof to the intersection of the Kodiak south leg. We turned on the Kodiak range because the Chirikof range wasn't acting properly as we couldn't pick up the Chirikof beam. Still on 037, we turned on the Kodiak range and picked up a weak "A" signal with a very strong background about 15 minutes earlier than we should have. In other words, as soon as we turned on Kodiak, we were very close to the beam and we shouldn't have been. The identification signals at Kodiak were O.K. except for being slow. As I remember, they were OF. As soon as we turned on the Kodiak beam, we turned to 360 degrees approximate- ly to get the beam. The weak "A" persisted so we increased heading 10 degrees at a time, picking up the beam and then back to "A". We increased to 090 degrees and hit the "N" for about one minute. We decreased heading to 330 degrees for five minutes to recross beam, but were unable to find beam although we decreased heading to 270 degrees, but continued with a strong "N". We picked up land on the radar on the port and dead ahead. We kept it to the port believing we were going up the east side of the island on the "N" side of the beam. We went on instruments due to 0-0 conditions after having picked up land, lost the land and when we found it again (heading about 0 degrees), we changed heading to find the beam, but were unable to do so again after the first time. Heading towards land, we flew keeping it on the starboard on contact, visibility about two miles, ceiling anywhere from 0 to 800 feet. We were headed to the left because we were getting the "N" signal with strong background which would in- dicate the right hand side of the beam. At 1955 Victor, we asked for and received landing instructions, also information that field lights were on. This information we received through airways. We flew keeping the land on the starboard by contact and radar and followed the coast very closely several times. At 2043 Victor, we were asked for a long count. We were flying along the coast up until then trying to establish contact doing most of it on radar. After the long count, we could hear some of the bearings, ones from Kodiak were badly garbled. Randall called Kodiak and said to speak clearly and they were trying to relay them as fast as they could. The plane is not equipped to guard more than one frequency at a time. We could listen to the airways or the inter-phone. It is a very poor set-up for instrument flight. As we had land close, we had to switch to inter-phone and probably lost some of the bearings while we were. We were flying by radar reports from navigator and radio man. There would have been enough bearings if we had them, but at that particular time were in a narrow pass and banking into sharp turns at 300 to 500 feet. We picked up the lights on the starboard. They were lights in two parallel rows on the starboard and another group to port as we headed into the bay. The lights in parallel rows turned out to be Karluk. The group of lights was Old Karluk. We saw the river and looked on the chart for a similar river, but we still thought we were on the east side of the island and tried to find a river there. At that time we heard the airways say that they were turning on a light on Woody Island at 2043 Victor. I climbed to 7300 feet on course 180 degrees for better reception on the light and airways asked it we were on instruments or contact. We replied that we were on instruments. We could see the moon shining through the overcast and estimated tops at 10,000 feet. Some airways called us just after we had given the long count at 7300 feet, I believe it was Randall; I asked for a repeat on some bearings and Randall asked for a repeat saying my transmitter was weak. That was the last transmission I was able to get out; I couldn't repeat what they wanted. The radio operator said some transmitter light had gone out. We had the emergency IFF on too. Our gas was less than planned because of the head wind which was strong- er than forecast. I would estimate it at 40 to 45 knots. When we found the ceiling at Chirikof dropping, we increased speed to 190 knots indicated and used more gas. So now our reserve was too low to climb higher and as we could not sight the light, we returned to the surface and picked up land on contact. All bearings at that time were poor. The ADF was hunting. At 7300 ft. we reported heading 180o with land to port. I believe were just going out Karluk Bay and the land at the left was Cape Karluk. That was after my transmitter had gone out and I tried to call and tell you we had lights, but you didn't hear any more from us. There was no ice that we know of. The radio operator was trying to send MOs, but the transmitter was out. I received no call to circle for two minutes. We circled in the bay keeping contact with the lights, trying to get the radio fixed, but we were unable to get any transmitter to work. We turned on the landing lights after slowing to 130 knots as we figured somebody on the ground there would see them. The starboard light stuck in full extended position and it couldn't be retracted. The port one retracted. We circled with the starboard light on about three times to the left in that general vicinity and keeping the lights of Karluk in view. At one time we came in a very few feet of hitting one of the cliffs as the starboard light reflected in snow squalls. It might have been Tanglefoot. The rear mains ran dry and we circled a little bit longer until we had approximately 120 gallons total remaining in front main tanks and figured it best to go down and make our first attempt leaving gas for a sec- ond attempt if necessary. The sea was not visible; we couldn't tell any- thing at all about wind or swell. The starboard light was pointed up rather than down. We decided to make two circles after we decided to ditch and got ready in the aft end. - 2 - (Fitzpatrick, Ens. C.L.) I told the gunner in the hatch to look for lights and Sherman was getting the rafts squared away. Everybody checked their jackets I believe, and loaded Very cartridges. We had cartridges in all 30, I believe, the gunner carried the Very pistol and some of the cartridges. We got some parachutes ready to throw out for possible shelter on the beach and took down that small first aid kit above the door and finally found the other first aid kit. The radioman was sitting in the main cabin with his knees drawn up and a blanket behind him leaning against the radio compartment door. A little step goes down toward the oil tank on which I sat with my head against the table leg holding on to part of the base on the table. I was sitting sideways and on my left facing aft was the mechanic holding on to the oil tank with a parachute padding his head and part of his shoulder. The gunner was sitting facing aft with his back to the oil tank. The door was wedged open with the small ladder and the astro-hatch was open. (Sherman, Lt.(jg) K.L.) I laid down on top of the luggage in the after portion of the ship. (Moorehead, Lt. A.F.) When we started in, we were approximately five miles out from the beach and we circled and headed directly at 100 feet towards the lights of Old Karluk. Tierney was calling out the altitudes from the altimeter down to 50 feet and then cushioned his head. The first time I got a glimpse of the water, I added throttle again as we were still too far out. The tail was hitting crests of waves, but when I gave it the power, it pulled it into the air again. We touched two times that way and the third time was final. We were flying at 75 to 80 knots with 30 degree flaps and wheels up, in a fully stalled altitude. It worked very well, good control on the yoke and fair rudder control. The wind was from the northeast because it drifted us from Old Karluk to Cape Karluk in the life raft and would have blown us possibly around the point. At the last sitting down, I had a half second glimpse of the waves, as we hit, it didn't seem to make much noise. Tierney and I both had on shoulder straps. It was a very success- ful ditching. Entire crew performed duties efficiently. There was no panic noticed at any time. (Tierney, Lt.(jg) P.F.) I used the radioman's cushion to pad my head against the windshield and kept one hand on the switches. (Moorehead, Lt. A.F.) Tierney cut the switches and then pulled his safety belt. He then pulled the escape hatch twice and it would not open. I let go of the yoke, pulled my safety belt with the left hand and hit the escape hatch with my head and the right hand,it went out. It was all done quickly. - 3 - There was some water coming from the escape hatch due to bow wave. I pushed up and dat on the top of the cabin facing forward, swung my feet out until Tierney was out and the navigator was calling to the radioman who wasn't in sight. Everyone was calm and working. The plane captain was working on the door trying to remove the raft, but it would not come out. The plane captain broke the cable holding it. I got out on the wing and asked if everyone was out. Each one called out his name. The plane captain and I were the last two off the wing and we jumped in as the nose settled. The plane remained horizontal 15 to 20 seconds from the time it hit and in 15 to 20 seconds more it went vertical. If we hadn't had an escape hatch over both pilot and co-pilot, Tierney wouldn't have gotten out. We figured from what the natives said, that we were 3/4 to a mile from shore. The wind was running parallel to the shore at that time; there were 5 to 5 1/2 foot swells. The other raft never got out of the door. After we went into the water with the Mae Wests, Sherman had the raft with the gunner and the radioman was picked up later. Fitzpatrick was helping push the raft by swimming alongside. (Sherman, Lt.(jg) K.L.) I was told to take the raft and pull the release so it would open and then I saw it fly out the door. I guess it hit the gunner in the face and he shoved it out of the door. (Fitzpatrick,,Ens. C.L.) Sherman was out of the plane before it stopped and about that time I went out of the astro-hatch which was directly above me. That's when the plane captain came out. He came out on the wing and I saw three of them in the water. We were all out and everybody was in the water around the raft before the plane went up on it's nose. (Moorehead, Lt. A.F.) I didn't get in the raft for about a half hour and he (Tierney) was in the water for 3/4 of an hour before being picked up by the natives in the dory from Karluk. We landed at 2145 Victor. The under-part of the nose was smashed and caused the plane to sink so rapidly. Tierney started in for shore and I started after him after calling all the crew and getting an answer that they were all still swimming. Shortly after that, Fitzpatrick yelled that he had the raft and so I swam in his direction. I got in the raft about 2213 Victor. There was one paddle in the raft and the other one was missing or lost in getting the raft inflated. We got in the raft and tried paddling in for shore. The one paddle we had broke and we used our hands. The raft shipped quite a bit of water, but still held up pretty well. We - 4 - couldn't get rid of the first flight boots--the emergency zippers didn't work. You can't swim with the flight boots on. Do not ditch with flight boots; do wear gloves. We drifted into shore slowly and were possible drifting to Cape Karluk. The plane captain saw a light and said it was a boat. A dory was sent out for us with six men aboard. About that time the gunner got his Very pistol, but his hands were cold and he couldn't work it very well. The Very pistol is essential at night. One of the shells landed within a few feet of Tierney who was still in the water and lighted him up and the people in the dory saw him. We had a flash light that Fitzpatrick had stuffed inside of his sleeve. We used the flash light to attract attention. The rescuers had to pull Tierney into the dory as he couldn't help himself. Tierney was picked up at 2230 Victor and they picked up the rest of us from the raft at 2245 Victor. We towed the raft for a distance, but released it as it was causing too much drag. The next morn- ing we found it on the beach north of Cape Karluk. We landed on the south side of the Karluk River about 2315 Victor and walked up to the houses. Everyone except the plane captain needed some assistance. Everyone was in the houses by 2330 Victor and in dry clothes. I sent the message at 0815 on the 18th of March. We had 120 gallons of gas when we hit; a loud crash was heard by the people and if the nose hadn't caved in, it would probably have stayed horizontal longer. Safety belts and shoulder straps were very good. The Mae Wests were very good and should be carefully checked before each flight. I strongly advise against having more than seven men aboard at any time in PV type. There was no gear washed ashore during the next two days except for the life raft and one parachute bag. The parachute bag had been stowed in the nose which further led us to believe that the nose had broken open. _________________________ A.F. Moorehead, Lt., USNR